Disinformation is false information deliberately spread to deceive people. It is sometimes confused with misinformation, which is false information but is not deliberate.
Should private companies decide what politician people will hear about? How can tech policy make our democracy stronger? What is the role of social media and journalism in an increasingly polarized society? Katie Harbath, a former director for global elections at Facebook discusses these questions in a lecture about politics, policy and democracy. Her unparalleled experience as a political operative combined with her decade long experience working on political elections across the globe make her a leading intellectual voice to shape the future of civic engagement online. In her lecture to honor the legacy of former Wisconsin State senator Paul Offner she shares historical context on the evolution of technology and presidential election campaigns. She also talks about the impact of the 2016 election and the post-truth reality online that came with the election of Donald Trump. In her concluding remarks she offers some ideas for future regulations of technology to strengthen civic integrity as well as our democracy and she answers questions during her Q&A.
tl;dr
As social media companies face growing scrutiny among lawmakers and the general public, the La Follette School of Public Affairs at University of Wisconsin–Madison welcomed Katie Harbath, a former global public policy director at Facebook for the past 10 years, for a livestreamed public presentation. Harbath’s presentation focused on her experiences and thoughts on the future of social media, especially how tech companies are addressing civic integrity issues such as free and hate speech, misinformation and political advertising.
03:04 – Opening remarks by Susan Webb Yackee 05:19 – Introduction of the speaker by Amber Joshway 06:59 – Opening remarks by Katie Harbath 08:24 – Historical context of tech policy 14:39 – The promise of technology and the 2016 Facebook Election 17:31 – 2016 Philippine presidential election 18:55 – Post-truth politics and the era of Donald J. Trump 20:04 – Social media for social good 20:27 – 2020 US presidential elections 22:52 – The Capitol attacks, deplatforming and irreversible change 23:49 – Legal aspects of tech policy 24:37 – Refresh Section 230 CDA and political advertising 26:03 – Code aspects of tech policy 28:00 – Developing new social norms 30:41 – More diversity, more inclusion, more openness to change 33:24 – Tech policy has no finishing line 34:48 – Technology as a force for social good and closing remarks
The financial sector is a highly regulated marketplace. Deepfakes or artificially-generated synthetic media are associated with political disinformation but have not yet been linked to the financial system. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace issued a scintillating working paper series titled “Cyber Security and the Financial System” covering a wide range of cutting edge issues from the European framework for Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming (TIBER) to assessing cyber resilience measures for financial organizations to global policies to combat manipulation of financial data. Jon Bateman’s contribution titled “Deepfakes and Synthetic Media in the Financial System: Assessing Threat Scenarios” takes a closer look on how deepfakes can impact the financial system.
tl;dr
Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are enabling novel forms of deception. AI algorithms can produce realistic “deepfake” videos, as well as authentic-looking fake photos and writing. Collectively called synthetic media, these tools have triggered widespread concern about their potential in spreading political disinformation. Yet the same technology can also facilitate financial harm. Recent months have seen the first publicly documented cases of deepfakes used for fraud and extortion. Today the financial threat from synthetic media is low, so the key policy question is how much this threat will grow over time. Leading industry experts diverge widely in their assessments. Some believe firms and regulators should act now to head off serious risks. Others believe the threat will likely remain minor and the financial system should focus on more pressing technology challenges. A lack of data has stymied the discussion. In the absence of hard data, a close analysis of potential scenarios can help to better gauge the problem. In this paper, ten scenarios illustrate how criminals and other bad actors could abuse synthetic media technology to inflict financial harm on a broad swath of targets. Based on today’s synthetic media technology and the realities of financial crime, the scenarios explore whether and how synthetic media could alter the threat landscape.
Deepfakes are a variation of manipulated media. In essence, a successful deepfake requires a sample data set of a original that is used to train a deep learning algorithm. It will learn to alter the training data to a degree that another algorithm is unable to distinguish whether the presented result is altered training data or the original. Think of it as a police sketch artist who will create a facial composite based on eye-witness accounts. The more available data and time the artist has to render a draft, the higher the likelihood of creating a successful mugshot sketch. In this paper, the term deepfake relates to a subset of synthetic media including videos, images and voice created through artificial intelligence.
The financial sector is particularly vulnerable in the know-your-customer space. It’s a unique entry point for malicious actors to submit manipulated identity verification or deploy deepfake technology to fool authenticity mechanisms. While anti-fraud prevention tools are an industry-wide standard to prevent impersonation or identity theft, the onset of cheaper, more readily available deepfake technology marks a turning point for the financial sector. Deepfakes may be used to leverage a blend of false or hacked personal identifiable information (PII) data to gain access or open bank accounts, initiate financial transactions, or redistribute private equity assets. Bateman focused on two categories of synthetic media that are most relevant for the financial sector: (1) narrowcast synthetic media, which encompasses one-off, tailored manipulated data deployed directly to the target via private channels and (2) broadcast synthetic media, which is designed for mass-audiences deployed directly or indirectly via publicly available channels, e.g. social media. An example for the first variation is the story of a cybercrime that took place in 2019. A Chief Executive Officer of a UK-based energy company received a phone call from – what he believed – his boss, the CEO of the parent corporation based in Germany. In the phone call, the voice of the German CEO was an impersonation created by artificial intelligence and publicly available voice recordings (speeches, transcripts etc). The voice directed the UK CEO to immediately initiate a financial transaction to pay a Hungarian supplier. This type of attack is also known as deepfake voice phishing (vishing). These fabricated directions resulted in the fraudulent transfer of $234,000. An example for the second variation is commonly found in widespread pump and dump schemes on social media. These could range from malicious actors creating false, incriminating deepfakes of key-personnel of a stock-listed company to artificially lower the stock price or creating synthetic media that misrepresents product results to manipulate a higher stock price and garner more interest from potential investors. Going off the two categories of synthetic media, Bateman presents ten scenarios that are layered into four stages: (1) Targeting Individuals, e.g. identity theft or impersonation, (2) Targeting Companies, e.g. Payment Fraud or Stock Manipulation, (3) Targeting Financial Markets, e.g. creating malicious flash crashes through state-sponsored hacking or cybercriminals backed a foreign government, and (4) Targeting Central Banks and Financial Regulators, e.g. regulatory astroturfing.
In conclusion, Bateman finds that at this point in time, deepfakes aren’t potent enough to destabilize global financial systems in mature, healthy economies. They are more threatening, however, to individuals and business. To take precautions against malicious actors with deepfake technology, a number of resiliency measures can be implemented: broadcast synthetic media is potent to amplify and prolong already existing crises or scandals. Aside from building trust with key audiences, a potential remedy to deepfakes amplifying false narratives is the readiness to create counter-narratives with evidence. To prevent other companies from potential threats that would decrease the trust in the financial sector, an industry wide sharing of information on cyber attacks is a viable option to mitigate coordinated criminal activity. Lastly, the technology landscape is improving its integrity at a rapid succession rate. A multi-stakeholder response bringing together leaders from the financial sector, the technology sector and experts on consumer behavior with policymakers will help to create more efficient regulations to combat deepfakes in the financial system.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a declassified report detailing efforts by foreign actors to influence and interfere in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections. The key finding of the report: Russia sought to undermine confidence in our democratic processes to support then President Donald J. Trump. Iran launched similar efforts but to diminish Trump’s chances of getting reelected. And China stayed out of it altogether.
On September 12, 2018 then President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13848 to address foreign interference in U.S. elections. In essence, it authorizes an interagency review to determine whether an interference has occurred. In the event of foreign interference in a U.S. election the directive orders to create an impact report to trigger sanctions against (1) foreign individuals and (2) nation states. A comprehensive breakdown of the directive including the process of imposing sanctions can be found here. I will only focus on the findings of the interagency review laid out in the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) pursuant to EO 13848 (1)(a). The ICA is limited to intelligence reporting and other information available as of December 31, 2020.
Findings
The former President touted American voters before his own election in 2016, during his presidency and beyond the 2020 presidential elections with unsubstantiated claims of foreign election interference that would disadvantage his reelection chances. In Trump’s mind, China sought to undermine his chances to be reelected to office while he downplayed the role of Russia or Iran. The recently released ICA directly contradicts Trump’s claims. Here’s the summary per country:
Russia
Russia conducted influence operations targeting the integrity of the 2020 presidential elections authorized by Vladimir Putin
Russia supported then incumbent Donald J. Trump and aimed to undermine confidence in then candidate Joseph R. Biden
Russia attempted to exploit socio-political divisions through spreading polarized narratives without leveraging persistent cyber efforts against critical election infrastructure
The ICA finds a theme in Russian intelligence officials pushing misinformation about President Biden through U.S. media organizations, officials and prominent individuals. Such influence operations follow basic money laundering structures: (1) creation and dissemination of a false and misleading narrative, (2) conceal its source through layering in multiple media outlets involving independent (unaware) actors, and (3) integrating the damning narrative into the nation states official communication after the fact. A recurring theme was the false claim of corrupt ties between President Biden and Ukraine. These began spreading as early as 2014.
Russian attempts to sow discord among the American people took place through narratives that amplified misinformation about the election process and its systems, e.g. undermining the integrity of mail-in ballots or highlighting technical failures and exceptions of misconduct. In a broader sense, topics around pandemic related lockdown measures or racial injustice or conservative censorship were exploited to polarize the affected groups. While these efforts required Russia’s cyber offensive units to take action, the actual evidence for a persistent cyber influence operation was not conclusive. The ICA categorized Russian actions as general intelligence gathering to inform Russian foreign policy rather than specifically targeting critical election infrastructure.
Iran
Iran conducted influence operations targeting the integrity of the 2020 presidential elections likely authorized by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
Unlike Russia, Iran did not support either candidate but aimed to undermine confidence in then incumbent Donald J. Trump
Iran did not interfere in the 2020 presidential elections as defined as activities targeting technical aspects of the election
The ICA finds Iran leveraged similar influence tactics as Russia targeting the integrity of the election process presumably in an effort to steer the public’s attention away from Iran and towards domestic issues around pandemic related lockdown measures or racial injustice or conservative censorship. However, Iran relied more notably on cyber-enabled offensive operations. These included aggressive spoofing emails disguised as to be sent from the Proud Boys group to intimidate liberal and left-leaning voters. Spear phishing emails sent to former and current officials aimed to gain impactful information and access to critical infrastructure. A high volume of inauthentic social media accounts was used to create divisive political narratives. Some of these accounts dated back to 2012.
China
China did not conduct influence operations or efforts to interfere in the 2020 presidential elections
The ICA finds China did not actively interfere in the 2020 presidential elections. While the rationale in their assessment is largely based on political reasoning and foreign policy objectives, the report provides no data points for me to evaluate. The report does not offer insights into the role of Chinese Technology platforms repeatedly targeted by the former President. A minority view by the National Intelligence Office for Cyber (NIO) holds the opinion that China did deploy some cyber offensive operations to counter anti-Chinese policies. Former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe leads this minority view expressed in a scathing memorandum that concludes the ICA fell short in their analysis with regard to China.
Recommendations
The ICA offers several insights into a long, strenuous election cycle. Its sober findings help to reformulate U.S. foreign policy and redefine domestic policy objectives. While this report is unable to detail all available intelligence and other information it offers some solace to shape future policies. For example:
Cybersecurity – increased efforts to update critical election infrastructure has probably played a key role in the decreased efforts around cyber offensive operations. Government and private actors must continue to focus on cybersecurity, practise cyber hygiene and conduct digital audits to improve cyber education
Media Literacy – increased efforts to educate the public about political processes. This includes private actors to educate their users about potential abuse on their platforms. Continuing programs to depolarize ideologically-charged groups through empathy and regulation is a cornerstone for a more perfect union
YouTube’s recommendation algorithm is said to be a gateway to introduce viewers to extremist content and a stepping stone towards online radicalization. However, two other factors are equally important when analyzing political ideologies on YouTube: the novel psychological effects of audio-visual content and the ability of monetization. This paper contributes to the field of political communications by offering an economic framework to explain behavioral patterns of right-wing radicalization. It attempts to answer how YouTube is used by right-wing creators and audiences and offers a way forward for future research.
tl;dr
YouTube is the most used social network in the United States and the only major platform that is more popular among right-leaning users. We propose the “Supply and Demand” framework for analyzing politics on YouTube, with an eye toward understanding dynamics among right-wing video producers and consumers. We discuss a number of novel technological affordances of YouTube as a platform and as a collection of videos, and how each might drive supply of or demand for extreme content. We then provide large-scale longitudinal descriptive information about the supply of and demand for conservative political content on YouTube. We demonstrate that viewership of far-right videos peaked in 2017.
YouTube is unique in its combination of leveraging Google’s powerful content discovery algorithms, i.e. recommending content to keep attention levels on its platform and offering a type of content that is arguably the most immersive and versatile: video. The resulting product is highly effective to distribute a narrative, which caused journalists and academics to categorize YouTube as an important tool for online radicalization. In particular right-wing commentators make use of YouTube to spread their political ideologies ranging from conservative views to far-right extremism. However, the researchers draft a firm argument that the ability to create and manage committed audiences around a political ideology who mutually create and reinforce their extreme views is not only highly contagious to impact less committed audiences but pure fuel to ignite online radicalization.
Radio replaced the written word. Television replaced the spoken word. And online audio-visual content will replace the necessity to observe and understand. YouTube offers an unlimited library across all genres, all topics, all public figures ranging from user-generated content to six-figure Hollywood productions. Its 24/7 availability, immersive setup by incentivising comments and creating videos, allows YouTube to draw in audiences on much stronger psychological triggers than its mostly text-based competitors Facebook, Twitter or Reddit. Moreover, YouTube transcends national borders. It enables political commentary from abroad ranging from American expats to foreigners to exiled politicians or expelled opposition. In particular the controversial presidency of Donald Trump triggered political commentators in Europe and elsewhere to comment (and influence) the political landscape, its voters and domestic policies in the United States. This is important to acknowledge because YouTube has more users in the United States than any other social network including Facebook and Instagram.
Monetizing The Right
YouTube has been proven valuable to “Alternative Influence Networks”. In essence, potent political commentators and small productions that collaborate in direct opposition of mass media, both with regard to reporting ethics and political ideology. Albeit relatively unknown to the general populous, they draw consistent, committed audiences and tend to base their content around conservative and right-wing political commentary. There is some evidence in psychological research that conservatives tend to respond more to emotional content than liberals.
As such, the supply side on YouTube is fueled by the easy and efficient means to create political content. Production costs of a video are usually the equipment. The required time to shoot a video on a social issue is exactly as long as the video. In comparison drafting a text-based political commentary on the same issue can take up several days. YouTube’s recommendation system in conjunction with tailored targeting of certain audiences and social classes enable right-wing commentators to reach like-minded individuals and build massive audiences. The monetization methods include
Ad revenue from display, overlay, and video ads (not including product placement or sponsored by videos)
Channel memberships
Merchandise
Highlighted messages in Super Chat & Super Stickers
Partial revenue of YouTube Premium service
While YouTube has expanded its policy enforcement of extremist content, conservative and right-wing creators have adapted to the fewer monetization methods on YouTube by increasingly relying on crowdfunded donations, product placement or sale of products through affiliate marketing or through their own distribution network. Perhaps the most convincing factor for right-wing commentators to flock to YouTube is, however, the ability to build a large audience from scratch without the need of legitimacy or credentials.
The demand side on YouTube is more difficult to determine. Following the active audience theory users would have made a deliberate choice to click on right-wing content, to search for it, and to continue to engage with it over time. The researchers of this paper demonstrate that it isn’t just that easy. Many social and economic factors drive middle class democrats to adopt more conservative and extreme views. For example economic decline of blue-collar employment, a broken educational system in conjunction with increasing social isolation and lack of future prospects contribute to susceptibility to extremists content leading up to radicalization. The researchers rightfully argue it is difficult to determine the particular drivers that made an individual seek and watch right-wing content on YouTube. Those who do watch or listen to a right-wing political commentator tend to seek for affirmation and validation with their fringe ideologies.
“the novel and disturbing fact of people consuming white nationalist video media was not caused by the supply of this media radicalizing an otherwise moderate audience, but merely reflects the novel ease of producing all forms of video media, the presence of audience demand for white nationalist media, and the decreased search costs due to the efficiency and accuracy of the political ecosystem in matching supply and demand.”
While I believe this paper deserves much more attention and a reader should discover its research questions in the process of studying this paper, I find it helpful to provide the author’s research questions here, in conjunction with my takeaways, to make it easier for readers to prioritize this study:
Research Question 1: What technological affordances make YouTube distinct from other social media platforms, and distinctly popular among the online right?
Answer 1: YouTube is a media company; media on YouTube is videos; YouTube is powered by recommendations.
Research Question 2: How have the supply of and demand for right-wing videos on YouTube changed over time?
Answer 2.1: YouTube viewership of the extreme right has been in decline since mid-2017, well before YouTube changed its algorithm to demote far-right content in January 2019.
Answer 2.2: The bulk of the growth in terms of both video production and viewership over the past two years has come from the entry of mainstream conservatives into the YouTube marketplace.
This paper offers insights into the supply side of right-wing content and gives a rationale why people tend to watch right-wing content. It contributes to understanding how right-wing content is spreading across YouTube. An active comment section indicates higher engagement rates which are unique to right-wing audiences. These interactions facilitate a communal experience between creator and audience. Increased policy enforcement effectively disrupted this communal experience. Nevertheless, the researchers found evidence that those who return to create or watch right-wing content are likely to engage intensely with the content as well. Future research may investigate the actual power of the recommendation algorithm on YouTube. While this paper focused on right-wing content, the opposing political spectrum including the extreme left are increasingly utilizing YouTube to proliferate their political commentary. Personally I am curious to better understand the influence of foreign audiences on domestic issues and how YouTube is diluting the local populous with foreign activist voices.
Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake provide a detailed rundown of the evolution and legislative history of cyberspace. The two leading cybersecurity experts encourage innovative cyber policy solutions to mitigate cyberwar, protect our critical infrastructure and help citizens to prevent cybercrime.
The Fifth Domain, commonly referred to as cyberspace, poses new challenges for governments, companies and citizens. Clarke and Knake discuss the historic milestones that led to modern cybersecurity and cyber policy. With detailed accounts of how governments implement security layers in cyberspace, gripping examples of breaches of cybersecurity and innovative solutions for policymakers, this book ended up rather dense in content – a positive signal for someone interested in cybersecurity, but fairly heavy for everybody else. Some of the content widely circulated the news media, other content is intriguing and through-provoking. While the policy solutions in this book aren’t ground-breaking, the authors provide fuel for policymakers and the public to take action on securing data, but, perhaps more importantly, to start developing transparent, effective cyber policies that account for the new, emerging technologies within machine learning and quantum computing. Personally, I found the hardcover edition too clunky and expensive. Six parts over 298 pages, however, made reading this book a breeze.
