Tag: U.S. Foreign Policy

The officially stated goals of the foreign policy of the United States of America, including all the bureaus and offices in the United States Department of State, as mentioned in the Foreign Policy Agenda of the Department of State, are “to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community”. The United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs states as some of its jurisdictional goals: “export controls, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware; measures to foster commercial interaction with foreign nations and to safeguard American business abroad; international commodity agreements; international education; and protection of American citizens abroad and expulsion”. U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid have been the subject of much debate, praise, and criticism, both domestically and abroad.

The Nuclear Option in Cyberspace

Stuxnet was a malicious computer worm that caused substantial damage to Iran’s nuclear program. It was likely deployed to prevent a conventional military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The 2015 cyber attacks on Ukranian critical infrastructure caused loss of energy for hundreds of thousands citizens of Ukraine in December. It was likely staged to test cyber operations for the upcoming 2016 U.S. presidential election. Both cases offer interesting takeaways: (a) offensive cyber operations often empower rather than deter an adversary and (b) offensive cyber operations resulting in a devastating cyber attack to the integrity of the target may be responded via conventional military means. But where exactly is the threshold for escalating a cyber attack into conventional domains? How can policymakers rethink escalation guidelines without compromising international relations? This paper discusses achieving strategic stability in cyberspace by way of transferring the concept of a nuclear no-first-use policy into the current U.S. cyber strategy.

tl;dr

U.S. cyber strategy has a hypocrisy problem: it expects its cyberattacks to deter others (defend forward) without triggering escalatory responses outside cyberspace, while it is unclear about what it considers off-limits. A strategic cyber no-first-use declaration, like the one outlined in this article, could help solve risks of inadvertent instability while allowing cyber-operations to continue.

Make sure to read the full paper titled A Strategic Cyber No-First-Use Policy? Addressing the U.S. Cyber Strategy Problem by Jacquelyn Schneider at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770970

In 2018 the Trump administration adopted its progressive National Cyber Strategy. These sort of policy declarations are commonly filled with agreeable generalities, albeit this National Cyber Strategy read in conjunction with the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy introduced a new, rather reckless cyber posture of forward attack in cyberspace as a means of a preemptive cyber defense. Key themes, e.g.

Using cyberspace to amplify military lethality and effectiveness;
Defending forward, confronting threats before they reach U.S. networks;
Proactively engaging in the day-to-day great power competition in cyberspace;
Actively contesting the exfiltration of sensitive DoD information;

raise important questions of national security. Why does an industrial superpower like the United States feel a need to start a cyber conflict when it could redirect resources toward building effective cyber defense systems? How many cyber attacks against critical U.S. infrastructure are successful that it would justify a forward leaning cyber defense? What is the long-term impact of charging the military with cyber strategy when the private sector in Silicon Valley is in a much better position to create built-in-cybersecurity and why aren’t resources invested back into the economy to spur cyber innovation? Each of these questions is material for future dissertations. Until then, instead of a defend forward strategy in cyberspace, a cyber policy of no-first-use might complement securing critical infrastructure while ensuring allies that the U.S. cyber capabilities are unmatched in the world and merciless if tested.

No-first-use is a concept originating in the world of nuclear warfare. In essence, it means

“a state declares that although it has nuclear weapons, and will continue to develop and rely on these weapons to deter nuclear strikes, it will not use nuclear weapons first.”

Instead conventional (non-nuclear) warfare will be utilized to respond to attacks on its sovereignty. These policies are not treaties with legal ramifications if violated. They’re neither agreements to ban production of certain weapon systems nor intended as arms control measures. In fact, no-first-use policies often take shape in form of a public commitment signaling restraint to friends and foes. They are made for strategic stability in a given domain.

No-First-Use Cyber Policy

Taking the no-first-use concept to cyberspace may be a national security strategy at low cost and high impact. Cyberspace is by its configuration transient, hard to control, low cost of entry and actor-independent. For example, a web crawler is at times a spiderbot indexing websites for search engines to produce better search results. At another time the same web crawler is configured to recon adversary cyber infrastructure and collect intelligence. Yet another time, the tool may carry a malicious payload while scraping website data. This level of ambiguity introduces a wealth of cyber policy hurdles to overcome when drafting a no-first-use cyber policy. Schneider recommends starting with distinguishing the elements of cyber operations in its strategic context. As mentioned before some actions in cyberspace are permissible, even expected, other actions using the same technology, are not. Now, there is no precedence for a cyber operation to be so effective at scale that it would compromise its target (state) altogether. For example, no known cyber operation has ever irreparably corrupted the energy infrastructure of a state, destroyed social security and health data of its citizens and redirected all government funds, bonds and securities without a trace or leaving the state in a position unable to respond within conventional warfare domains. This means the escalation risk from a cyber operation against critical infrastructure is lower in cyberspace compared to an attack with conventional weaponry. Therefore a successful no-first-use cyber policy must focus on the cyber operation that produces the most violent results and is effectively disrupting a conventional defense (by disrupting critical infrastructure).

Another consideration for an effective no-first-use cyber policy is the rationale of continued development of cyber capabilities. A no-first-use cyber policy does not preclude its parties from actively testing adversaries’ cyber vulnerabilities; it only bars them from exploiting such weaknesses unless the adversary strikes first.

A strong argument against adopting a no-first-use cyber policy is diplomatic appearances. First, it might signal a weakness on part of U.S. cyber capabilities or indicate to allies that the U.S. will not commit to protecting them if under attack. Second, it may also result in hypocrisy if the U.S. launches a first strike in cyberspace after political changes but is still bound to a no-first-use policy. For Schneider a successful no-first-use cyber policy

“credibly convinces other states that the U.S. will restrain itself in cyberspace while it simultaneously conducts counter-cyber operations on a day-to-day basis.”

She also recommends strategic incentives through positive means: information sharing, foreign aid or exchange of cyber capabilities. The end goal then ought to be strategic deterrence through commitments in cyberspace to restraint high-severity cyber attacks.

I found the idea of a no-first-use cyber policy captivating, albeit inconceivable to be implemented at scale in cyberspace. First, even though cyber operations with the potential to blackout a state are currently reserved for professional militaries or organized cyber operators in service of a state-actor, I don’t believe that a lone non-state actor is not capable of producing malicious code with equal destructive powers. Second, I see attribution still as a roadblock despite improving cyber forensics. Any democracy would see the hypocrisy of mistakenly engaging a non-state actor or the risk of misidentifying a state-actor as perpetrator. Moreover, the current state of attribution research in cyberspace is considering humans with certain intent as foundation when future cyber conflict may be initiated by a rogue or faulty autonomous weapon system under substantial control of an artificial intelligence. Third, any policy without legal or economic ramifications isn’t worth considering. An effective deterrence is hard to achieve without “skin in the game”. Perhaps an alternative to a no-first-use cyber policy would be a first-invest-into-cyber defense policy. Emulate the Paris Climate Accord for cyberspace by creating a normative environment that obligates states to achieve and maintain a minimum of cybersecurity by investing into cyber defense. This way constant innovation within the private sector reduces vulnerabilities, which will lead to a self-sustaining deterrence.

Trump’s Grand Strategy

Legacy matters these days. As President-elect Joe Biden is about to take office I thought it is worth my while to reflect on America’s leadership role in the world. How did Donald Trump fare with international relations? What happened to the immigration ban and withdrawal of U.S. military overseas? Is the world safer because of Trump’s ‘America First‘ rhetoric? This paper sheds light on the contrasting ideologies that governed U.S. foreign policy under Trump.

tl;dr

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.

Make sure to read the full paper titled Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security by Murat Ülgül at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1786928

When Donald Trump assumed office as 45th President of the United States the world was facing a known unknown. A mercurial real-estate developer and reality show entertainer was suddenly in a position to reshape America’s international relations. Until then, Trump’s political record consisted of commentary on current affairs and one failed attempt to run for President in 2000. His business record was strained with few successful real estate developments in New York City and a number of unsuccessful business ventures in different industries.

Historically U.S. foreign policy is set by the President. Entire presidencies rested on a sophisticated strategy to secure American interests at home and abroad. Following WWII the United States adopted a foreign policy of primacy, which according to Patrick Porter branches into a grand strategy of

Military preponderance
Allied relationships
Proliferation of U.S. capitalism
Absolute control of nuclear (power) weapons

However Trump’s world views stand in stark contrast with that of previous administrations. His nationalistic rhetoric of ‘America First’ struck a chord in harmony with authoritarian dictatorships. It created concerns among democratic nations whether President Trump would continue to invest into alliances and build amicable relationships or if he would lead the United States into isolationism. His chaotic leadership style had many scholars speculate whether Trump would recognize the power imbalance between America’s allies and Russia or China. It raised questions whether Make America Great Again rhetoric meant a complete withdrawal from the international stage and mark a pivot point in America’s pursuit of primacy as its grand strategy.

“Grand strategy can be defined as a great power’s roadmap to realising its long-term objectives with its actual and/or potential resources”

In this paper, Murat Ülgül reframes the analysis of Trump’s grand strategy by focusing on the complementary elements of a nationalist traditionalism rather than its competing positions. Unlike other scholars have suggested, Trump’s grand strategy is not exclusive continuity of previous “business as usual”. Albeit divisive in rhetoric throughout his pre-election years and time in office, his grand strategy cannot be viewed as raw isolationism. Moreover Ülgül makes a case for a combination of nationalism and traditionalism. Nationalism can be observed in the character and image of Donald Trump himself. Traditionalism leaves its mark in Trump’s choices for his national security advisors, e.g. Michael Flynn, H. R. McMaster and John Bolton, which had gained significant influence over Trump throughout the course of his presidency. This unique but ambiguous combination appears to mitigate the negative effects of each individual strategy. Both are conflict-prone strategies yet the rate of international conflicts has steadily decreased during Trump’s tenure. America First has led the United States to a delayed or complete disengagement from international contests. All the while his administration is running a traditional, hawkish narrative that has led foreign powers known for the pursuit of authoritarian objectives to cooperate and resolve their disagreements with America’s allies against a potential fallout from the United States. In other words, the administration continues to influence global policy without military leverage or engagement. Nevertheless its impact is waning. As a result of this grand strategy, the United States has suffered some reputational damage for fewer countries retained faith into America’s ability to manage international relations or to be a beacon of democracy.

While this paper goes into more depth than I can summarize here, I found this idea of a mixed grand strategy not as new as the paper suggests. Prior to WWII, the United States practiced a calibrated offshore balancing. In 2016, Stephen Walt suggested a deliberate withdrawal from conflict areas in favor of an intentional engagement of strategic partners. Walt’s propositions imply an element of deliberation of U.S. foreign policy which never seemed to register with Trump, but it helps in finding Ülgül’s argument even more convincing. It further helps to see some positive from this oddball presidency as he disappears from the international (relations) stage.

Consistent Chaos: Trump’s Leadership Style And US Foreign Policy

U.S. foreign policy concerns a wide range of highly complex issues. It requires consistency, integrity and long-term strategy. President Trump demonstrates none of these characteristics in his presidency. Accordingly, foreign policy experts grow concerned about the direction of U.S. diplomatic relations. Does Trump have the leadership skills to recognize the weight of the office? Is his erratic behavior on social media a harbinger for isolationism? And what is the impact of Trump’s leadership style on U.S. foreign policy? It turns out: there is a method to this chaos.

tl;dr

This article examines President Trump’s foreign policy behavior as a product of a leadership style that is entrenched in a plutocratic worldview. We apply elements of Hermann’s leadership traits framework to Trump’s engagement with NATO, and characterize him as a low-conceptual complexity president, enabled by limited search for information and advice, a confrontational and insensitive approach to his environment, and proclivity to violate international norms and rules. We show that Trump’s low- conceptual complexity is underpinned by a plutocratic worldview which is transactional and money-first. We argue that while this signals change between Trump and his predecessors, this plutocratic approach has been one of the most significant sources of consistency within Trump’s administration.

Make sure to read the full data memo titled Low-conceptual complexity and Trump’s foreign policy by Asaf Siniver and Christopher Featherstone at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339911972_Low-conceptual_complexity_and_Trump’s_foreign_policy

When Trump was inaugurated as the 45th President of the United States, I began to wonder what his Presidency will mean for our country, then in pursuit of a grand strategy of primacy. The Donald Trump the world knew until 2016 seemed to be oblivious to pursuing long term objectives. His entertainment persona was crafted for instant gratification, quick returns and scorched earth when necessary. Isolationism seemed inevitable as promised in his campaign. How would he handle this dichotomy? I am fascinated with human behavior. In particular in leadership positions. I believe responsibility and public pressure does shape the character, but the outcome might be one leader becoming a beacon for hope and progress while another will be remembered as the demise of democracy as we know it. Which is President Trump? An intriguing paper by researchers from the University of Birmingham analyzed the influence of Trump’s leadership style on U.S. foreign policy. They argue that Trump follows a plutocratic worldview, basically placing a higher value on individual wealth than on social welfare, which in conjunction with his mercurial nature and often unpredictable decision-making has led him to conflate complex foreign policy with his simple transactional leadership style.

The Trump administration struggled from inauguration day with filling important cabinet and senior staff roles. A polarized election campaign produced the highest rate of staff turnover in the history of the U.S. government. As Trump’s campaign promises centered around domestic issues, a rigor negligence of foreign policy was omnipresent. The nature of America’s presidential system places Trump as the head of state and the head of government in a unique position to shape U.S. foreign policy based on his personality and his conduct. This resulted in a high degree of uncertainty of U.S. foreign policy and left allies as well as trade relationships in a suffocating limbo. This paper examined the degree of conceptual complexity present as observed in the President’s cognitive behavior over the course of his first term as President of the United States. Conceptual complexity refers to an individual’s ability to identify and differentiate several degrees of information. It indicates prowess to structure complex information using critical thinking and reflection. Magret G. Herman presented conceptual complexity as part of the seven leadership traits that can be analyzed based on what they (leaders) say. The researchers extrapolate this definition onto leaders, who

“understand reality through a multi-dimensional prism. They are sensitive to contextual variables and rely on information gathering and deliberation before making decisions. “

Within international and diplomatic relations this might encompass an ability to identify cultural nuances, economic dependencies and access to natural resources of one country in conjunction with multilateral trade agreements, historic alliances or geopolitical tensions and conflict zones. A leader’s soft skills to compare, weigh and reflect this plethora of competing information under pressure defines high-conceptual complexity leaders. This is in contrast with

“low-complexity leaders (who) generally do not differentiate the dimensions of their environment. They view the world in binary terms (e.g good/bad, friend/enemy), and are thus more likely to make decisions based on intuition and emotion“

Even the most lenient interpretation of it cannot suppress the immediate notion of Trump’s leadership style being drenched in low-conceptual complexity. Here, this paper is building a case that Trump effectively deceived his electorate of blue-collar workers who bought into the idea that a businessman with noble interests has arrived to ‘drain the swamp’. Through divisive and polarizing rhetoric, Trump disguised his administration of unprecedented wealthy staff as equals with the disenfranchised poor citizens in this country. Therefore creating a plutocratic rule by the few over the many – an American tendency with a rich history. Taking this together, the researchers find Trump’s decision-making process with regard to U.S. foreign policy is largely driven by plutocratic interests to allocate wealth of the many to a few wealthy. It places U.S. foreign policy in a transactional environment. In this environment, Trump allows few critical voices in his short process of deliberating foreign policy measures with little information at hand and an approach of keeping his hands close to the chest rendering complex diplomatic processes next to impossible to implement.

“His advisers didn’t know whether he was an isolationist or a militarist, or whether he could distinguish between the two.“

The result is a catastrophic U.S. foreign policy that creates fertile ground for political and diplomatic repercussions on the internal stage and is an invitation for threats against U.S. national security. Trump’s contradictions are further observed in the debate around climate change. In 2009, the private citizen Trump and other business leaders lobbied for decisive investments into clean and renewable energy. Ironically this is an acknowledgment of climate change, which Trump has later denied and is persistently questioning on social media. In 2017, then President Trump initiated the exit of the United States from the Paris Climate Accord rendering it as detrimental to U.S. economic interests. In another example of Trump exhibiting plutocratic low-conceptual complexity, the tradition of paying a first diplomatic visit to our neighbors in Canada or Mexico was set aside to ‘make a deal’ with Saudi Arabia. Incidentally, Trump did not hide his personal business interests in Saudi Arabia. Such insensitivity to diplomatic nuance is low-conceptual complexity fueled by the pursuit of increasing individual wealth (or here his personal brand value as dealmaker). The paper closes with the relationship of President Trump and NATO. Trump operates with a small staff and wealthy cabinet members. He possesses little to zero knowledge of details of fiscal procedures of NATO or the overarching purpose of NATO. Further, Trump, a native of New York City did not seem to be aware that the infamous Article 5 was invoked in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. And while all these examples imply erratic cognitive contradictions, the researchers were able to identify consistency in the chaos that is Trump’s leadership. Viewed through a prism of plutocratic worldview established in his business endeavors, Trump exhibits strong signals for a leadership style governed by low-conceptual complexity. His transactional mindset based on limited information and suppressing critical voices applied to U.S. foreign policy is a threat to the foundations of peace.